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Abstract 
This article provides a critical assessment from a strategic perspective of 
the South African military involvement in the Central African Republic that 
culminated in the Battle of Bangui. The strategic assessment was aimed at an 
understanding of the South African armed forces and their government’s strategic 
approach and logic (i.e. strategic ways) through a consideration of, firstly, their 
strategic objectives and end states and, secondly, a critical reflection on the 
military means that were available and employed in the Central African Republic. 
The authors question the logic of South African political and military objectives 
through an emphasis on the absence of South African interests in the Central 
African Republic, the failure of the executive to inform parliament, the dubious 
and blurred intentions of the African National Congress government and the 
absence of a clear political–military nexus for the operation. The lack of sufficient 
military capabilities for the deployment was assessed through a consideration of 
overstretch, obsolescence, neglect and mismanagement of military resources. The 
article concludes that not only did the government set the military up for failure; it 
also succeeded in creating the perfect conditions for a strategic fiasco.  
Introduction 
In Africa, organised violence is still responsible for the death and 
displacement of many on the continent. A youthful population, poverty, weak 
governance, a lack of infrastructure and a 
shattered education system are amongst the 
factors that still breed violent – mostly 
intrastate – conflict.1 In addition, violent 
conflict and the power of non-state military 
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actors remain key elements of and for strategising in Africa. Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that strategy, defined as “the use that is made of force and the threat of 
force for the ends of policy”,2 in the African security domain often has to confront 
two parallel challenges: how to promote conflict resolution, post-conflict 
reconstruction and development on the one hand, and on the other, how to stand up 
to armed non-state actors when the host government’s security forces prove 
inadequate.3 
The South African (SA) government views itself and wants to be seen as a 
net exporter of security in Africa. Since democratisation, South Africa increasingly 
took up a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building and 
post-conflict reconstruction in the continent. South Africa displays a clear 
declaratory preference for negotiated settlements through dialogue and consultation 
with parties. In contrast to this preference, the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) appears to have become a rather prominent vehicle or agency of 
South Africa’s diplomacy towards Africa. The SA military involvement in the 
Central African Republic (CAR), followed soon by peace enforcement as part of 
the rapid intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic (DR) of the Congo 
(2013) and military commitments to the so-called African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Crises (ACIRC) force (2014), should be seen in the context of this 
rather subtle shift from implicit to explicit use of the SA military to export and 
project security into Africa. Africa, though, has a tendency to become a quagmire 
for those who force strategies or think they can impose unilateral solutions. 
The study on which this article reports, aimed to provide an exposition of 
SA military strategy in the CAR by means of the strategic equation – strategy 
equals ends, i.e. objectives toward which one strives, ways, i.e. courses of action, 
and means, i.e. instruments by which some end can be achieved.4 The research 
question underlying the article originated from a general impression that the event 
in the CAR where 15 SA soldiers died in clashes with Seleka rebels points towards 
a military blunder rather than a logical outcome of policy informing military 
strategy in the pursuit of vital national interests. If military coercion is indicative of 
defending vital national interests, which interests were so vital in the CAR to 
activate the military option and sending highly trained combat troops to defend 
them? This uncertainty frames the primary question, namely which policy 
imperatives informed the military deployment to the CAR and can this be 
explained by way of the strategic equation of strategic ends, ways and means? 
Responses to the events in Bangui appear to be embedded primarily in 
government statements, military communiqués, and media responses questioning 
the politico-military sensibility of decisions and subsequent events. In April 2013, 
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in the immediate aftermath of the events, a 40-page publication by Heitman 
appeared, which largely deals with the unfolding of the battle.5 Heitman frames the 
gap between military means and political expectations, if not ambitions. He 
emphasises how political preferences not to fund the SANDF properly but to 
expect them to undertake complex and dangerous missions, eventually culminated 
in military casualties.  
The International Crisis Group (ICG) Report of June 2013 elaborates upon 
the unfolding events in the CAR over time, but hardly covers the SA involvement. 
The report is concerned mainly with the regional responses from the surrounding 
regional actors, but nonetheless notes the aberration of the SA military presence so 
far removed from its regional sphere, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).6 This very matter of geographic distance remains weakly 
explained by SA political decision-makers and a void in understanding how armed 
coercion ties in with policy decisions. In October 2013, an Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS) Policy Brief by Heitman again raised the topic of intervention by 
generally framing matters on intervention operations into Africa. Heitman 
compared such interventions with the South African–Bangui experience to 
highlight that interventions are expensive and complicated and not to be taken 
lightly. A go-it-alone approach is hardly expected and dangerous to say the least, 
but this is exactly what transpired with the SA mission to the CAR.7  
Other literature generally covers opinions and probes through questions 
related to what happened and requests for enquiries by the media and political 
actors from the opposition benches over who was at fault.8 This crop of literature 
questions the logic and interests behind the deployment of SA soldiers to the CAR, 
whether the SA president informed parliament accordingly, why the service 
provider for strategic airlift did not comply and whether personal interests played a 
role.9 Although in the public domain, this literature set is fragmented and tends to 
focus on two particular aspects: why exactly did South Africa deploy soldiers to 
the CAR, and why did this deployment result in the deaths of so many soldiers. 
Media questions and the political sparring did, however, pay scant attention to 
questions on military strategy. 
Overall, the SA literature does not include matters of strategy. At most, it 
questions policy decisions, the role of individuals, technical and tactical matters of 
equipment, social responsibility towards families, and recognition of bravery by 
the contingents. It also appears that the latter aspects of tactical skills and bravery 
became a major theme in the media, as well as the dominant narrative from senior 
officials at the political and military levels of decision-making.10 The scale of the 
media–opposition–government sparring in fact overshadowed any meaningful 
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discussion about the policy–strategy interface that placed SA soldiers in the distant 
CAR.  
While the literature on the events in CAR is perhaps not difficult to come 
by, that which deals with the particular matter of South Africa’s military strategy in 
CAR is glaringly absent or somewhat fragmented in parliamentary questions and 
responses that tend to be classified information. The latter is visible in the 
contradiction that the minister stated that all memorandums of understanding 
(MoUs) are public documents, but the one on the CAR ‘suddenly’ became a 
classified document.11 One thus has to scrutinise secondary documentation in order 
to respond to the research question underpinning this article. 
The following discussion introduces an outline of South Africa’s foreign 
policy towards Africa followed by a description of the situation in the CAR. The 
argument then turns towards an analysis of the purpose of SA involvement in the 
CAR. Next, follows an analysis of South Africa’s military capability employed in 
the CAR with some critical conclusions directed at the SA military course of 
action. 
Africa as primary driver in South African foreign policy 
SA official foreign policy documents provide some context to, 
understanding of and perspective on South Africa’s military involvement in the 
CAR. Africa seems to shape and define South Africa’s foreign policy outlook. 
Pronouncements by senior political officials of the ruling ANC, political office 
bearers and SA policy documents are, firstly, quite explicit that Africa is at the 
centre of South Africa’s foreign policy.12 Secondly, the need for South Africa to 
play a leading role “that will promote regional cooperation, peace and security”13 
through conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction on the African continent is a key guiding principle of South Africa’s 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).14 Thirdly, SA 
foreign policy guidelines also place a strong emphasis on steering South Africa 
away from unilateral approaches and actions in Africa towards not only a 
preference but also a demand or requirement for bilateral and multilateral action. 
Fourthly, and in line with the preference for bilateral and multilateral action, is a 
strong policy preference for regional, continental and global political, economic 
and security structures and actors when engaging with and acting in Africa. South 
Africa, it is noted for example in DIRCO’s strategic plan for 2013–2018, is 
committed to multilateralism and a rules-based international order, and to this end, 
promotes global security, sustainable development, human rights and international 
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law through its participation in international fora, notably the United Nations (UN) 
system and its specialised agencies, funds and programmes.15 
Consequently, South Africa’s foreign policy is highly value-driven with its 
emphasis on Africa’s renaissance, good governance, peace and stability. Schoeman 
describes it as a foreign policy of peace.16 However, as Lalbahadur points out, 
foreign policy decisions are not simply a matter of applying ethics and values. It is 
also about complex decisions based on the trade-offs between domestic and 
international imperatives and between short- and long-term interests, mediating 
and navigating the tension between values and interests.17 In the case of South 
Africa, trade-offs specifically concern the tension between the country’s African 
agenda and its commitment to the promotion of human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law. This inability to reconcile an inclination towards respect for other 
countries’ sovereignty on the one hand, and towards human rights and democracy 
on the other, seems to provide some explanation for the evaluation of a general 
pattern of inconsistency in South Africa’s foreign policy. Some argue that this 
inconsistency tends to erode South Africa’s reputation as a regional and continental 
power whose foreign policy influences events across the continent.18 
Moreover, South Africa’s foreign policy priorities are seen to be 
ambiguous19 with many who are of the opinion that what precisely is directing the 
country’s foreign policy has become obfuscated over time. The storyline seems to 
run from Nelson Mandela’s emphasis on the promotion of human rights, via Thabo 
Mbeki’s anti-colonial, anti-imperialist rhetoric tied to the active pursuit of the 
African agenda and high involvement in African issues, to confusion, a lack of 
strategic direction and an inability to envisage and map out a foreign policy 
correctly under Jacob Zuma.20 South Africa’s military debacle in the CAR seems to 
mirror starkly the alleged confusing and inconsistent nature of the country’s 
foreign policy under the Zuma administration.21 
The inconsistency argument should also be tied to Alden and Schoeman’s 
view that South Africa’s foreign policy is constrained by the structural weaknesses 
of the country’s own economy, a declining administrative and political capacity to 
tap South Africa’s resources for strategic purposes, and the legitimacy of its 
persistent claims to represent Africa’s interests.22 From a different perspective, it 
brings the unresolved issue of South Africa’s identity, a host of domestic 
limitations linked to material capabilities and internal politics, and the divided 
continental reaction to SA leadership into sharp focus.23 The contentious 
appointment of a South African, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as chairperson of the 
African Union Commission (AUC) clearly illustrates the point that not all African 
countries applaud SA stewardship of continental matters.24  
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Although foreign policy is almost always about mediating and navigating 
the tension between values and interests, it remains difficult to discern SA foreign 
policy interests. Some argue that economic development, security and stability in 
the region, and peace and conflict resolution within Africa seem to dominate the 
agenda.25 Another view holds that SA interests are defined by a domestically 
driven material imperative and its external role conceptions – particularly the need 
to be anti-imperialist, to break the United States’ and Western hegemony, and to 
free Africa from any form of external imperialism. The policy gist seems to be 
guided by the notion that South Africa should be the ‘gateway’ to Africa as a 
secure financial and political platform for exploring economic opportunities in 
Africa.26 Even the country’s membership of the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South 
Africa (BRICS) group of countries is portrayed by President Zuma in terms of the 
country’s assumed position as the gateway into Africa, South Africa’s supposed 
role as the natural leader of Africa, and the country’s so-called ability to speak on 
behalf of the continent as a whole.27  
Three key considerations thus seem to shape South Africa’s approach 
towards the African continent: the importance of the country’s domestic interests; 
the need to grow African markets for SA goods, and the need for peace and 
stability in Africa.28 Cohen describes this in more realist terms when he argues that 
SA foreign policy at present “reflects domestic politics: duplicitous, Machiavellian 
and surrounded by a vague odour of corruption”.29 This perceived fluid and 
perhaps uncertain policy environment nonetheless acts as the guiding intelligence 
for SA decision-makers involved in matters of strategy, and one such decision-
making hub involves those who must bring the SA armed forces into the policy–
strategy equation. 
The military strategy division of the SA military categorises the whole of 
Africa as an area of strategic importance, whilst the area that makes up the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) is described as an area of 
strategic influence. A further distinction is made between what is referred to as 
strategic partners, working partners and symbolic partners. Strategic partnerships 
are rooted in long-term strategic interests such as South Africa’s membership of 
BRICS and states that constitute important and key interests. Economic relations, 
such as those with countries in Europe, seem to shape ideas on working 
partnerships. The most interesting of the categories – and sometimes the most 
visible – is the symbolic category, relations that are defined by what can be called 
pragmatic political decisions and debates, and which involve the weaving of 
historical political considerations into the fabric of foreign relations. For the SA 
government, these symbolic connections are demarcated by the historical 
relationships built up during the struggle for liberation in South Africa. The 
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countries making up these partnerships often lack strategic resources, are of a 
geographical position in close proximity to South Africa, or have historical ties 
dating back to before 1994.30 These are relations that, in the view of the ANC 
government, directly affect South Africa’s international standing and prestige. Of 
course, South Africa’s relationship with many countries in Africa is of a symbolic 
nature. It is historical in nature and driven by the identity of the ruling ANC as a 
political party demonstrating solidarity in the struggle for Africa’s liberation. 
Historical solidarity, comradeship and shared political worldviews, instead of 
political, economic and security interests and concerns, are shaping relations in this 
context. These realities, Hengari argues, “resulted in [the ANC] having less space 
to pursue a strong regional policy that marries good governance and democracy 
with South Africa’s regional economic agenda”.31 
Thus, and as a matter of irony, South Africa has a strange love–hate 
relationship with Africa – almost as if the country is not part of Africa and as if 
South Africa needs to prove its ‘Africa-ness’.32 In the National Development Plan, 
for example, it is deemed necessary to declare for some strange reason that “We 
are Africans […] We are an African country […] We are an essential part of our 
continent.”33 Like many countries from outside Africa, South Africa tends to deal 
with ‘Africa’ from a foreign policy perspective as if Africa does not consist of 
different countries with a huge diversity of nations and peoples, rich and poor, 
developed and underdeveloped, who have a variety of interests, opinions and 
prejudices. Moreover, South Africa encourages and enforces this image of Africa 
in its own search for status and positions in the UN and elsewhere, to be seen as 
Africa’s voice, and as a country that can speak on behalf of Africa. What is often 
missing from not only the SA political, but also the administrative and bureaucratic 
spheres, is a nuanced understanding and approach in conceptualising, engaging and 
dealing with countries in Africa. The SA political approach to Africa seems to be 
somewhat dogmatic, an Africa-at-all-cost approach that does not necessarily allow 
for a nuanced and flexible interpretation of South Africa’s various interests in 
specific African countries. It is a conceptual approach that on the surface does not 
seem to make provision for the fact that South Africa may have political and other 
types of rivals, competitors and even enemies in Africa.  
This inconvenient truth was physically, hard and clearly demonstrated by 
the undeniable reality of the casualty list in the March 2013 Battle of Bangui. 
South Africa’s African foreign policy perspective and approach, thus, often seem 
to be based on the naïve assumption that South Africa, like Nelson Mandela, is 
welcomed with enthusiasm and open arms by every single individual and country 
in ‘Africa’.34 It is possible to argue that this is not a policy approach that often 
eschews judgement in application. The motto seems to be ‘Africa at all costs’. 
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The emphasis on peace and security in Africa in the strategic documents of 
both DIRCO and the Department of Defence and Military Veterans (DoDMV), by 
definition, underlines the military as an important instrument of South Africa’s 
foreign policy in Africa. The recently published Defence Review, specifically, 
makes provision for a layered defence approach as a driver of South Africa’s 
military strategy. The first layer defines the need to influence the international 
security agenda through integrated diplomacy efforts and the pursuit of national 
objectives. It also highlights the need for strategic engagement of the UN and the 
African Peace and Security Architecture, to pursue defined multi-lateral security 
objectives, promote the deepening of democracy on the African continent, and 
promote peace, security and development on the continent. However, it also 
outlines the need to pursue “… strategic bi-lateral objectives”. The second layer 
refers to the need to ‘safeguard’ the SA people and the country’s territory, to 
protect vital SA national interests “collaboratively or deliberately”, and to 
contribute to South Africa’s developmental agenda. The third layer highlights the 
importance to “… defend and protect the territory, sovereignty and people of the 
Republic of South Africa”.35 Threats closer to home seem to bring a preference for 
armed coercion to the fore, whilst the approach to the outer layers seems to rely 
much more on softer constructive roles and collaborative ways. 
Entering the cauldron: Instability in the Central African Republic 
Since the events of March 2013, now commonly known as ‘the Battle of 
Bangui’ when SA forces met in battle with Seleka rebels in the capital city of the 
CAR, the country lapsed back into what can be typically termed ‘war amongst the 
people’.36 The image of anarchy in the CAR emerges in the absence of any 
meaningful central government offering some resemblance of security as a political 
good to serve as a catalyst for good governance. Since the Battle of Bangui, a new 
and rather extensive wave of external intervention missions in the CAR took shape 
that for all practical purposes are the only barriers to total internal collapse. For 
some observers, this image of the CAR could well be ‘business as usual’, but the 
pattern of events since January 2013 flags some important aspects to consider. 
From an SA perspective, the clash between SA soldiers based in Bangui 
and rebel forces was a military battle between two opposing armed forces brought 
about by two widely differing sets of objectives. The SA military contingents in the 
CAR emerged from a little-understood SA–CAR MoU on military cooperation 
signed in February 2007.37 The Seleka rebel forces stem from fluid and 
unpredictable politics that characterise the region – also called ‘the tormented 
triangle’ – that give rise to a persistent proliferation of non-state armed groups 
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rising, splintering and merging in and around the CAR. In essence, the SANDF–
Seleka battle in Bangui represents opposing interests broadly portraying traditional 
against non-traditional interests: state interests pitted against personal-group 
interests clothed in heavily armed and externally supported rebel contingents. At 
the minimum, this is a representation of a challenge posed by heavily armed non-
state groups to the status quo pursued by African states. Of course, in the case of 
the CAR, France has often aided incumbent governments against rebels, as 
successive CAR governments were all unable to safeguard the country’s borders 
and its people.38 
From a level of analysis point of view, the CAR is an African sovereign 
state that finds itself at the mercy of actors such as rebel groups operating below 
the level of the state, actors at state level like France, South Africa, and Chad, and 
entities above the state as embodied by the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) and the African Union (AU). The pressures and 
influences from all three levels simultaneously affect the CAR with the country 
being in no position to stave off armed threats or deal with the outfall in any 
constructive manner. As a result, entities other than the CAR government have 
become main players in the CAR’s domestic landscape. 
Studies on the CAR often portray the country as a weak and fragile state – 
whether explicitly or implicitly. On the weak state index (now fragile states) of the 
Fund for Peace employing socio-economic and politico-military indicators, the 
CAR hovers at an index of approximately 105.3/120 and number 9/178 while being 
flagged as a high alert case. The CAR also persisted in the top 10 rankings of 
fragility since 2007. The country showed, in addition, the worst decline in score for 
2014 when it dropped from 105.3 (2013) down to 110.6 (2014) while reflecting the 
most significant shift towards more weakness out of 178 countries. The CAR 
furthermore regressed in the alert category from position 9 (2013) to position 3 
(2014) and so entered the very high alert category of fragile states in the 
international system. By 2013/2014, the CAR thus assumed the most serious levels 
of weakness and fragility according to the Fund for Peace index.39 
Weak states reflect a certain security dynamic in the sense that they fall 
victim to internal and external threats and vulnerabilities. The collective outcome is 
the failure to provide political goods to society, which acts as a catalyst for rising 
internal frustration and anger. Robert Rotberg outlines these matters in a specific 
manner. He argues that it is not the intensity, but the enduring nature of violence 
directed at the governing authorities that indicates weakness and failure.40 In the 
case of the CAR, this cycle of violence commenced after independence in 1960 
and still persists today with the period 2013/2014 perhaps reflecting the pinnacle 
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with references to genocide and a collapsed state being uttered.41 Mehler offers an 
overview depicting continuous internal strife, mutinies, interventions and rebellion 
to contest political power reaching back to 1965.42 Since 2010, the CAR lapsed 
into even worse internal strife with the rise of the Seleka rebel group coexisting 
with about seven other armed groups in the CAR, each fighting the central 
government on its own terms and agendas.43 
In the CAR, violence seems to stem from ethnic, religious and linguistic 
differences, and becomes more accentuated when one considers how resources 
enter the fray of competing groups.44 The history of internal armed strife broadly 
depicts conflict often unfolding along ethnic and religious fault lines. While earlier 
conflict profiles show a strong ethnic slant, events since February 2013 reflect an 
ominous religious divide. Ethnicity became an early tool of the divide-and-rule 
principle in CAR politics as different rulers used it to bolster their respective 
regimes. As leaders, Bozize used the Gbaya, Kolingba used the Yakoma, while the 
earlier ruler Patasse again rooted out the Yakoma factor in the security forces in 
particular to break the ethnic nexus and loyalty to his predecessor.45 Religion 
became particularly salient during 2013/2014 as the Seleka rebels extended their 
influence. The Seleka group is labelled ‘pro-Muslim’ and in response, the anti-
Balaka group emerged as a Christian counter to the plundering by the Seleka 
rebels. As a result, on 29 March 2014 for example, 24 civilians were killed when 
Chadian soldiers escorting Muslims opened fire in response to a suspected anti-
Balaka attack.46 The Balakas also stand accused of siding with the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda and, as such, religious battle lines were 
drawn between Muslim and Christian factions while in addition, the LRA is 
already on the international list of terrorist organisations. 
An inability to control borders and the loss of tracts of national territory to 
opposition forces place more pressure on authorities already weakened by an 
inability to implement policies to extend governance.47 The northeastern border 
regions between the CAR and the Sudan and between the Sudan, CAR and Chad 
are typical of transition zones where the local communities have little in common 
with their national centres of power. Weak border management leads to the flow of 
military material, small arms, migration of fighters and organised crime.48 
Concerning the loss of control over territory, Human Rights Watch pointed out 
how the Selekas regrouped in the northeast of the CAR to continue their rampage 
in the face of no government response to counter such mobilisation.49 In addition, 
even during earlier times, anti-Deby rebels from Chad merely used the northeastern 
part of the CAR as transit area between the Sudan and Chad in an attempt to 
unsettle the regime of Deby, ruler of Chad.50 As for the battle between the SA 
forces and the Seleka forces, it is not surprising that the latter mobilised and moved 
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unopposed by road up to the outskirts of Bangui where the SA military contingent 
offered the first meaningful resistance to their advance. 
In the CAR, the use of national and rebel security contingents by rulers 
became a pathway to maintain or contest power, but raised parallel threats to 
society. Predatory practices aimed at own communities and the growth of criminal 
violence combine to foster a general climate of lawlessness. Oppression and resort 
to coercion then becomes the standard response of government to threats and 
vulnerabilities.51 Amnesty International outlines atrocities by both the Bozize 
loyalists and the Selekas against civilians and those deemed opponents to their 
quest for political power while the incumbent government appeared helpless or 
unwilling to step in.52 As such, Amnesty International accuses successive 
governments and rebel opponents like Seleka of practices amounting to human 
rights violations by using armed violence against civilians in pursuit of power in 
Bangui, as well as in the surrounding countryside. Unfortunately, neither the rebel 
movement, nor the ousted regime or the incumbent government offers any hope of 
human security to the CAR society and protests to claim universal public goods are 
met with further force and violence from the rulers. 
The internal weakness of CAR is accentuated and exploited by actors 
sharing its regional setting that harbours what one could call ‘a rough 
neighbourhood’. Chad is viewed as a major player in the CAR instability, and the 
2013 advance of the Seleka rebels in particular,53 but the setting for the fragility of 
the CAR reaches beyond Chad. Sudan, Chad and the CAR reflect a dynamic akin 
to the view of Barry Buzan that their security and insecurity can hardly be 
considered in isolation and in fact took shape as a regional conflict formation. 
Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti refer to the tormented triangle represented by Chad, 
the Sudan and the CAR where the regional conflict dynamics are also heavily 
influenced by internal dynamics of the surrounding states.54 To the south, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter DR Congo) also comes into play, as 
a rebel movement from its volatile eastern region also entered the fray in 2002 to 
assist former ruler Patasse against the advancing forces of Bozize who eventually 
took power by overthrowing Patasse. There was also a prominent Chadian 
mercenary element in Bangui to assist with the overthrow and maintenance of 
power. Later, Bozize could not keep rebels at bay without French and Chadian 
forces (i.e. in November 2006). Amnesty International draws an intricate network 
of Chadian, Sudanese, Ugandan, Congolese, French and SA involvement in the 
CAR, presumably in support of the central authorities with the latter being 
challenged by an equally intricate collection of rebel forces with unpredictable and 
fluid loyalties reaching into CAR society, but also outwards to neighbouring 
regimes.55 
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For the purpose of this article, the above brings into focus two important 
matters. Firstly, the response or combination of responses most appropriate, given 
the argument that African conflicts tend to overwhelm those attempting to impose 
unilateral solutions, and secondly, the role of armed forces given the salience of the 
military option in the case of CAR. Regarding the most appropriate options to 
restore order and governance, Rotberg warns that revival of a weak and collapsing 
state is almost not an option.56 Even the better option of strengthening the state to 
prevent collapse is difficult, expensive and of long duration. It is however, within 
the rebuilding of security to support civil society and governance that the core or 
catalyst of revival resides. Here the argument links security establishments with 
rebuilding and strengthening. But, under closer scrutiny, the nexus between the 
rebuilding of military and security institutions shows a particular dynamic that is a 
conundrum rather than a credible solution. This is because many of the military 
contingents at play in the CAR contribute to rather than resolve its security 
dilemma. 
In the case of the CAR, the country’s security forces were central to the 
insecurity faced by society and the country in general. Not only coups, but 
mutinying factions and human rights violations, soldiers turning rebels and special 
personal military contingents and guards for elite protection characterise the profile 
of the CAR’s military forces (les Forces armées centrafricaines or FACA). Mehler 
outlines the reasons for FACA not functioning to contribute to the first political 
good of security: a collapsed security system, a patchwork-like composition of 
security forces, destroyed infrastructure, a lack of equipment, a lack of qualified, fit 
and trained personnel, and a dysfunctional chain of command.57 As such, FACA 
was unable to function, as the armed forces of the CAR enjoyed no real legitimacy, 
competed with private and rebel military contingents, and as such stopped to serve 
as a policy instrument of the central government. The aforementioned weakness of 
the CAR security forces became the presumed catalyst for SA military involvement 
with the idea to train and set CAR forces on a more professional footing.58 Their 
presence also led to the eventual clash between members of the SANDF and the 
Seleka rebels in and around Bangui in March 2013. Against this backdrop of 
almost no ways and means in the CAR to extend even basic security governance, 
the following discussion sets the Battle of Bangui within the context of SA policy 
and the elements of strategy. 
The South African political–military nexus in the Central African Republic 
For professional militaries, including the SA military, it is important to 
ensure a Clausewitzian logic in the conduct of operations. More specifically, 
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militaries need to operationalise foreign policy in general and specific foreign 
policy objectives in particular through the establishment of the nexus between 
specific national interests, military deployments and the use of force. The debate 
that followed on the deployment of the military to the CAR in 2007, and the 
resultant events in Bangui in March 2013 in which 15 SA paratroopers were killed, 
serve to prove this point.59 SA military deployments into Africa are informed by 
the basic political assumption of African unity that leads to the defence question of 
against whom we are we defending. The inability to answer this question often 
means that from a tactical and operational perspective, the SANDF is deploying 
lightly armed and poorly supported troops into volatile countries, often without 
heavy weapons or support. It was, thus, interesting to note how the SA forces that 
were deployed into the DR Congo in the immediate aftermath of the incident in the 
CAR were ‘up-gunned’ with the first-time deployment of Rooivalk attack 
helicopters.60 
A fundamental challenge in SA military operations, though, is the absence 
of a comprehensive and clearly articulated national security strategy.61 From a 
civil–military perspective, this means that deployments, such as the one to the 
CAR, cannot be justified under the banner of such a strategy or be criticised on 
grounds of these operations being in contradiction to the policy or strategy. Of 
course, it is possible to argue that some governments tend to be vague in this 
regard precisely because being vague provides them with increased freedom of 
action. Whether that is the case in South Africa, is doubtful. What materialises 
instead is “a haphazard, scatter-gun approach that invokes our national interests 
when convenient, and simply ignores it when it’s not”.62 When it is difficult to find 
the logic and to establish the link between military deployments and the protection 
or extension of clearly articulated national interests, military deployments become 
a civil–military issue. When this is augmented by a perceived urgent need for 
domestic military priorities in areas like border protection or counter-poaching and 
crime-related operations,63 society tends to look towards the military as an 
extension of the interests of the executive and its associates – not of Parliament or 
the people of the country in general. In Africa, as is elsewhere the case, domestic 
deployments are by custom concrete and indubitable and do not necessarily require 
comprehensive justification from the executive branch of government and 
legalisation from the legislative branch. Foreign deployments, in contrast, 
necessitate both justification and legalisation by means of the protection or 
extension of discernible national interests. 
The fact that the role of the military in Africa seems to have morphed from 
the established model of supporting strongmen to that of protecting and projecting 
economic power and influence brought SA military involvement in the CAR into 
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sharp focus.64 Explanations by the SA executive regarding the purported bilateral 
agreement that was supposed to legitimise the SA military involvement in the CAR 
are unconvincing and inadequate. The key question is not only whether the SA 
military presence in the CAR was legitimate but, rather, whether it was morally 
defensible in view of South Africa’s apparent support for an illegitimate regime in 
order to protect what seemed to be economic interests with strong links to powerful 
domestic political networks.65 
There were many allegations and much speculation that the SA 
intervention in the CAR was to protect private SA business interests that were 
closely linked to the presidency.66 More recently, this speculation seems to have 
been substantiated.67 At the time, though, this was strongly denied by the SA 
president with arguments that South Africa intervened in the interest of the safety, 
stability and security of the region.68 That begs the question – why only in 2013 
after a decade of turmoil in the CAR and the DR Congo, and through unilateral 
action that excluded the SADC, the AU and ECCAS? Obviously, the CAR adjoins 
the DR Congo, and South Africa may have feared that instability in the CAR 
would spread to the DR Congo. The DR Congo, unlike the CAR, is a member of 
the SADC, but strangely, South Africa has no embassy or diplomatic presence in 
the CAR, which casts some doubt upon the suddenly declared importance of the 
CAR in SA’s foreign policy.69 In a sense, this inconsistency harks back to the view 
above by Stupart of the SA government invoking national interests when 
convenient. 
In a briefing in Parliament on 3 April 2013, the Minister of Defence and 
Military Veterans highlighted that the SA deployment to the CAR was based on a 
bilateral MoU between the governments of South Africa and the CAR. Although 
the SA government refused to make the MoU public after the death of the South 
Africa soldiers in March 2013, the aim of the deployment seems to have been to 
assist with capacity building in the CAR. The MoU was signed in the context of 
the 2007 peace deal under the auspices of the AU between the CAR government 
and the rebel movements. The SA forces were to lead the process of integration of 
the armed forces. Military training was to be provided for very important person 
(VIP) protection and infantry soldiers whilst they were also supposed to provide 
equipment and uniforms, and refurbish bases. The MoU was renewed in December 
2012. With the deterioration of the security situation in 2012, South Africa 
deployed a ‘security force’ for the small training establishment and military 
equipment already positioned in the CAR.70 The additional soldiers, the minister 
emphasised, were not trainers. These soldiers were in fact from the parachute and 
special force regiments, which raised further questions about the employment of 
such highly specialised soldiers as a protection element. The minister also 
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highlighted in the briefing some disturbing developments in that after a seven-year 
training mission: 
 It was impossible to withdraw the training establishment of 26 trainers 
with their equipment and vehicles; 
 There was a steady decline in the number of people in the CAR that were 
being trained; and 
 There was uncertainty about the whereabouts of some of the CAR 
citizens that had been trained. 
Of great interest was the remark by the minister that the renewing of the 
MoU in 2012 was underpinned by the task “to protect the leadership of the 
country”. She also noted that the European Union (EU) representative called on the 
SANDF not to withdraw due to the tense and fragile situation in the country. Thus, 
the minister noted, “there was a history of coups. Instability could not be allowed, 
Rebels could not be allowed to overthrow the government. This was why RSA [i.e. 
South Africa] had led the process of demobilisation and re-integration”.71 
Opposition parties were quick to point towards the discrepancy in the 
explanations by the president, the responsible minister, and the chief of the 
SANDF. More specifically, they pointed towards the president’s explanation to 
Parliament in two letters. The first explained that the SANDF was employed to 
“assist with capacity building of the CAR Defence Force and [to] assist that 
country with planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration process”.72 The president noted in a second letter, “this employment 
will run up to the end of the duration of our MoU (memorandum of understanding), 
however if the situation improves in the intervening period, we will revise the 
protection element”.73 The neglect to make the contents of the MoU public, 
together with the wide explanation as to why SA was militarily involved in the 
CAR, opened the door for speculation, criticism, and doubt by society. 
In view of the general approach to foreign policy by the SA government, 
the real question concerning SA involvement in the CAR was why, if SA was to be 
involved in a military intervention in CAR, it did not take place under the umbrella 
of SADC, the AU or any other multilateral security structure and with the consent 
or agreement of ECCAS. Or, did the situation that unfolded in the CAR highlight 
the failure of the African security architecture, specifically its drive towards the 
creation of an African standby and rapid intervention capability?74 Why did South 
Africa – in the immediate aftermath of the incident in CAR in May 2013 – ask the 
AU for the creation of a new force, to be known as the ACIRC? This question is 
even more significant in the context of the immediate shift from South Africa’s 
unilateral military involvement in the CAR to its drive for a leading role in the 
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deployment of an intervention brigade of SADC soldiers within the UN 
Organization Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) to carry out 
targeted offensive operations against armed groups, such as the M23 rebels, that 
threatened peace in the DR Congo. At the time, the immediate SA involvement in 
the DR Congo seemed be a diversionary tactic in shifting media and societal 
attention away from the CAR incident. What it did not obscure, was the growing 
emphasis upon using the country’s armed forces as a leading policy instrument. 
The sudden prominence of South Africa in newly configured African 
response mechanisms might be encouraging, but given the military profile of such 
initiatives, it brings into focus the standing of the armed forces. South Africa’s 
armed forces seem to find themselves at a crucial crossroad at a time when the 
political expectations of the military as a foreign policy instrument appear to be at 
its zenith. 
South African military capability: Dysfunctions and over-commitments 
The 2014 Defence Review highlights the need for the SANDF to maintain 
the military capabilities to ensure the: 
 Freedom of South Africa to trade, including the free use of land, air and 
sea routes, good order at sea and in the airspace, and the safety and 
security of trade and transport hubs; 
 Security, domestically and externally, of fundamental resources, such as 
minerals, energy and water, including the safe and secure delivery, 
processing and distribution thereof; 
 Safety and security of domestic and external strategic installations; and 
 Safety and security of the SA people, both within national territory and 
abroad.75 
In view of these specific tasks, and from a strategic perspective, the SA 
military should be capable of fulfilling three key functions and roles. It should 
firstly be able to deter possible external threats and to deal decisively with those 
threats if they emerge. Secondly, unlike most developed states and mature 
democracies, but very much in line with the responsibilities of militaries in most 
developed countries, the SA military should be capable of performing internal 
stability tasks almost permanently. In the case of the SANDF, this typically 
includes border protection, anti-poaching operations, support to the police in the 
fight against crime and general support to the population in cataclysmic times of 
upheaval and disaster. Thirdly, South Africa’s position as a hegemon in Africa, 
linked to its international commitments as a regional power to play a key role in the 
stability, safety and security of the region and the continent, necessitates a military 
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capability to project and participate in peace and stability operations in the region 
and the continent. 
In reflecting on these capabilities, it is quite clear that the requirement for 
deterrence and the warfighting capability that underpins the need, necessitates a 
much heavier and more robust force than what is needed for internal stability and 
force projection. The internal stability and force projection capability, in contrast, 
is predominantly of a light, mostly infantry and rapid reaction nature. It is this 
discrepancy that Schoeman had in mind when she noted that, in an era of austerity, 
militaries find themselves hard-pressed to fulfil the dual role of conventional 
preparedness to defend national security and interests and to provide support to 
international commitments.76 The capability requirements are exacerbated by the 
inverse relationship between intensity and frequency in the conduct of these 
divergent missions. Air superiority, armour and artillery may be key capabilities 
for deterrence. Besides, infantry, internal stability and force projection cannot be 
done without sound strategic airlift, agile and sustainable logistics and good C3I 
(i.e. command, control, communications and intelligence).77 
Two factors that are of key strategic importance for South Africa’s 
strategic outlook and which speak directly to its military capability were 
highlighted by the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans in her 2014 Defence 
Budget speech in the aftermath of the Bangui debacle. Firstly, she pointed out that, 
at the time, the Department and, by implication the SANDF, were overextended 
“… by a host of events nationally, regionally, continentally, and internationally”.78 
Of course, central to these complex activities was the heavy involvement of the 
military in the stability, peace and security of specific countries in Africa. 
Secondly, at the time, the SANDF was in a serious state of decline characterised by 
force imbalances between capabilities, ageing technology, and the unaffordability 
of many of its main operating systems. Her view that “… the decline will get 
worse” was of even greater concern.79 In fact, even before the March 2013 Battle 
of Bangui, certain analysts expressed the harsh view that “… South Africa’s 
government has so neglected or mismanaged its military assets that it may soon be 
unable to defend itself, much less engage in international adventures” and “… the 
steady transformation of the SANDF into an assembly of riot police and border 
guards will be completed in just a few years”.80 Needless to say, these alarming 
factors about South Africa’s military forces did not arise overnight and served as 
an influential, albeit ignored backdrop to the decision to escalate SANDF forces in 
the CAR over the period December 2012 to March 2013. 
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Against the context of the comprehensive needs and demands from various 
actors for constructive involvement by the SA military, which underpins its 
overextension, the minister highlighted the need to – 
 arrest the decline in the SANDF;  
 rebalance the force through a process of reprioritising;  
 ensure capacity for the existing and current needs;  
 develop capacity to meet future challenges; and  
 build the strength of the SANDF to engage in limited warfighting if such 
a need should arise.81  
Nowhere was the acknowledged decline and lack of capacity as clearly 
demonstrated at the operational level as in the case of the CAR deployment. 
This is not the place to lambast the SA military again for its alleged general 
decline and dismal nature of its capabilities, its dysfunctional institutional culture, 
its general and widespread lack of discipline and leadership, and its lack of 
understanding by society. One only has to read the budget speeches of the 
Ministers of Defence and Military Veterans over the last more than ten years to 
gain some insight into the challenges confronting the military – and how warnings 
became more accentuated over time, and culminating in the brusque 2014 open 
speech by the incumbent minister on the state of the SANDF. The majority of the 
problems of the SANDF can be explained within the context of the history of the 
SA society in general and the military’s institutional roots in the anti-apartheid 
revolutionary movements and history of integration. This links to the disastrous 
decrease in the defence budget since 1994 to address SA welfare and social needs. 
The decrease in the defence budget was accentuated by the simultaneous growing 
demand for and employment of the SANDF. Many of the problems within the 
SANDF, of course, are not related to the budget and tend to be underpinned by 
challenges pertaining to institutional, cultural, leadership, discipline and a range of 
personnel dysfunctions that are complex and multidimensional, with wide-
spectrum and multi-layered implications.82 
Of greater concern is the lack of political will and military expertise to 
rectify and address the spectrum of problems that underpins the SANDF’s 
effectiveness and capabilities.83 As is clearly demonstrated in the 2014 Budget 
Speech of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, there seems to be a cold 
and clinical political recognition of the decline of the military function. The drive 
to rectify and address the key problems, however, can only be described in terms of 
incrementalism and tokenism. There is, in short, a lot of noise about the problem 
but few signals that anything tangible is being done. For the most part, the military 
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in Pretoria relies on crisis management and a scramble approach whenever new 
demands for military deployment are placed upon them.84 
Turning to the operation in the CAR, the SA forces in the CAR were not 
only too small and patently outnumbered, but confusion in the chain of command 
and the inability of the SA military to support its forces in the theatre of operation 
also had disastrous consequences.85 More specifically, the forces in the CAR 
eventually found themselves in a position in which no soldier wants to be.86 They 
were, for all practical purposes ‘blind’, with only a limited tactical intelligence 
capability on the ground and no reliable operational and strategic intelligence 
capability from Pretoria in support. The clear strategic indicators that were 
available to Pretoria about the unfolding of the crisis appeared to have been 
ignored.87 In retrospect, the Minister and the generals provided a somewhat naïve 
and almost conspiracy-driven outline of precisely how the situation in the CAR 
unfolded. The minister in this regard noted in her briefing to Parliament that: 
… such an attack had never been anticipated, there had been accusations of 
poor intelligence, nor was the base geared to repel an attack on such a 
scale. This might have been a naïve approach. The SANDF had never 
anticipated becoming involved in the conflict. The mandate had never 
changed.88 
In the CAR itself, the forces not only operated almost blindly; the force 
commander, as a colonel, also had no staff system to support him and South Africa 
had no diplomatic presence to provide diplomatic support and intelligence to link 
up with the French and influential neighbouring countries such as Chad.89 In effect, 
one could ask how such a state of affairs arose if there was any credible policy–
strategy logic between foreign affairs and defence to employ armed coercion as a 
way to defend national interests. 
Of greater concern was the SANDF’s lack of strategic airlift to either 
reinforce or withdraw the SA forces from the CAR. As a result, the forces had no 
medical support beside the small but professional medical contingent attached to 
the forces or the ability to evacuate the wounded and casualties from the combat 
area. Needless to say, armed with only small arms, the forces operated without any 
close air support or larger calibre indirect fire support systems. The lack of 
strategic airlift also meant that the SANDF was challenged in its second-line 
capacity to support and reinforce the forces in the CAR logistically. Thus, from a 
doctrinal perspective, it is important to question the employment of lightly armed 
parachute forces without the ability to reinforce such forces with heavier 
capabilities within a short period of time, and also the employment of 
reconnaissance-oriented Special Forces in a semi-conventional capacity for which 
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they are not equipped and, one may argue, not trained. On a higher level, whether 
out of principle or because of the general aversion of the SA government to work 
with the West and previous colonial powers, or because of a clash of interests, the 
SA forces did not cultivate the help of the French forces that were also deployed in 
the area. The best the French could do was to provide a guard of honour for the 
deceased South Africa soldiers being carried into the aircraft on their way back 
home. 
Conclusion 
Strategy, orchestrating the interplay between political ends and coercive 
means, served as a broad outline for addressing the SA military involvement in 
CAR. The following concluding remarks are therefore set within the outcomes and 
objectives, policy-related guides for decisions and actions and the operation of 
human resources and material assets that make up the logic of strategy. Here it is 
important to note that the norm of a SA military strategy to serve as a measurement 
for ends, ways and means in the case of CAR, hardly existed in this particular case. 
At most, the emergent Defence Review offers some guidance, and this is perhaps 
most visible in the frank responses of the defence minister. 
Concerning the outcomes sought, the CAR is a weak state that finds itself 
at a level of fragility where arresting the decline is barely within the collective, and 
even less so the unilateral capabilities of actors who seek a turn-around. South 
Africa thus had little prospect of arresting the decline in CAR through its unilateral 
initiative. At the minimum, failure is demonstrated by the absence of any 
meaningful turnaround in the CAR armed forces where South Africa focused most 
of its political and military resources for the preceding six years. The CAR forces 
(in spite of being the primary rationale for the governing MoU) played no role 
when asked to do battle against the Seleka rebels. 
When considering the means, SA foreign policy did not map out a clear 
pathway for bringing in the SANDF as a policy instrument, but the SANDF 
nonetheless became a prominent feature of the country’s foreign policy into Africa, 
which suggests some disequilibrium in the ways sought to pursue policy. The 
optimism of assisting in resolving dangerous African conflicts soon became 
tempered by repeated political and military warnings against a trend of escalating 
commitments. The CAR endeavour also demonstrated the gulf that developed 
between idealistic policy outlooks and the elements of strategy, both of which have 
to inform the kind of forces that South Africa had to prepare, train and equip in 
order to respond with credible military means to the growing policy demands for 
military diplomacy. It is not surprising that in the midst of the 2014 Defence 
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Review and the incumbent minister’s frank views, the persistent warnings about 
the decline of the SANDF was preceded by the alarming events in the CAR where 
SA soldiers fought bravely, but without the guiding intelligence of well-considered 
political and military backing to which they were entitled. 
From both strategic and policy perspectives, SA military involvement in 
the CAR registered close to zero on the scale of strategic outcome and 
effectiveness. In many mature democracies, such catastrophic strategic failure, 
probably would have toppled the government. Although the SA government and 
the SANDF were quick to highlight the skills, bravery and commitment of the SA 
soldiers (and rightly so) at grassroots level, the lessons to be learned from the 
failure all seem to be of a negative operational and strategic nature. More 
specifically, it is a case study of, firstly, how not to direct operations from a 
political and strategic perspective. Secondly, it speaks volumes of how not to 
resource operations that are beyond the operational and strategic reach of the 
armed forces. In combination, these two factors merge neatly to corroborate the 
forthright views of the 2014 Defence Review and the incumbent defence minister 
on the strategic ineptitude, inability and failure of contemporary strategy and SA 
strategic actors. 
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